Chapter V: Claims Concerning Lawful Weapons of Belligerent Attack by Mallison, W. T, Jr
International Law Studies – Volume 58 
Studies in the Law of Naval Warfare: Submarines in General and Limited Wars 





















The thoughts and opinions expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily of the U.S. 
government, the U.S. Department of the Navy or the Naval War College.  
CHAPTER V 
CLAIMS CONCERNING LAWFUL WEAPONS OF 
BELLIGERENT ATTACK 
The chapters of the present study appraising the claims and counter-
claims concerning combatants, areas of operation, and objects and methods 
of belligerent attack each considered subject matter which is highly special-
ized in terms of submarines and submarine warfare. Modern submarines, 
however, do not possess complete_ly distinctive weapons. The traditional 
gunnery, torpedo, and mine weapons of submarines which employ non-
nuclear explosives are also used by surface warships. In the same way, the 
nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, or substantially similar ones, which 
are employed by modern attack and missile submarines may also be used by 
other combatant units including surface warships, military aircraft, and 
land- or space-based launching systems.1 
A consideration of the law applicable to submarines must necessarily 
include a juridical appraisal of the weapons which these warships are cap-
able of using. This is a matter of particular urgency in conne<rtion with 
the contemporary "weapons of mass destruction." 2 The existence of 
such weapons has changed the quoted phrase from a figure of speech to 
a fact. 
A. THE HISTORIC EXPERIENCE CONCERNING THE ABOLI-
TION OR LIMITATION OF WEAPONS 
Although international law has not been particularly successful in abo-
~ishing or controlling weapons of war in the past, it is nevertheless essential 
to have an awareness of the historic experience. It should provide mean-
ingful background to the contemporary attempts to achieve juridical con-
1 The nuclear and thermonuclear weapons of modern submarines are surveyed 
in the text of Ch. I accompanying notes 39-43. For a prescient prediction of the 
offensive capabilities of modern submarines see Bush, Modern Arms and Free Men 
68- 70 ( 1949). Concerning space-launching systems see infra note 30. 
2 Such weapons are regarded as including biological, chemical, and nuclear ones. 
See generally Dept. of Defense, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (rev. ed. 1962); 




trol of weapons.3 This history should indicate, at the least, that modern 
problems concerning this subject are not entirely novel. 
In early warfare, knights had substantial military advantages over pea-
sant soldiers. Dr. Royse states that, prior to the introduction of the cross-
bow, "not a single knight would be killed in a battle, due to the heavy 
protecting armour." 4 When the crossbow came into use, it appeared to 
be a terrible and indiscriminate weapon of destruction since it could be 
used to kill mounted knights as well as humble foot soldiers. 5 The Second 
Lateran Council of the Roman Church ( 1139) prohibited the use of the 
crossbow and described it as a weapon which was "hateful to God and 
unfit for Christians." 6 In spite of this formal interdiction, the crossbow 
remained in general military use until more efficient weapons employing 
gunpowder replaced it. Dr. Royse has summarized the result of this ad-
vance in weapons technology: 
Powder and firearms in early times were also cursed as the devil's 
implements, and the Chevalier Bayard, fatally wounded in 1524 by 
a bullet, found some satisfaction in the thought that he had never 
given quarter to a musketeer. There was no pause, however, in the 
use of explosives and firearms. 7 
The principal limitation upon weapons stated by Hugo Grotius in 1625 
in his classic study of The Law of War and Peace was the prohibition of 
the use of poison. 8 He stated that this prohibition existed "from old times." 9 
It probably reflected the inefficiency of poison as a weapon. The Grotian 
interdiction was formulated in broad terms so as to include poisoning food 
and water as well as using weapons the points of which were tipped with 
poison.10 The contemporary prohibition is stated in the Regulations 
Annexed to Hague Convention IV ( 1907) and prohibits the employment 
of "poison or poisoned weapons." 11 Neither of these is likely to be efficient 
in modern war but they are probably still employed upon occasion by 
guerrilla and tribal military forces. 
The Declaration of Paris ( 1856) has been examined in the considera-
3 See e.g. Sixth Annual Report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, H.R. Doc. No. 58, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. ( 1967); U.S. Arms Control ·and 
Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament 1965 ( 1966). 
' Royse 166 (footnote ami tted). 
5 Royse 166. The crossbow was a leveler since it deprived knights of their prior 
status of "equal but ... more equal." See Orwell, Animal Farm 148 (1946). 
6 Royse 166; see also Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations 18 (rev. 
ed. 1954). 
7 Royse 167 (footnotes omitted). 
8 Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libris Tres, Bk. III, Ch. 4, sections 15-16, 2 
Classics of International Law 651-53 (Kelsey transl. 1925). 
9 Id. at Ch. 4, section 15, p. 652. 
10 Id. at Ch. 4, sections 15-16, pp. 651-53. 
11 Art. 2 3 (a ) . 
153 
tion of the traditional law of naval warfare.12 Its first article provided 
for the abolition of privateering. In spite of the abuses connected with 
privateering which sometimes made it very similar to piracy/3 the United 
States refused to accede to the Declaration. In his Message to the Congress 
of December 2, 1856, President Pierce stated: 
The aggressive capacity of great naval powers would be thereby 
[through the abolition of privateering] augmented, while the defensive 
ability of others would be reduced.14 
The Declaration of St. Petersburg ( 1868) 15 prohibited the use of 
projectiles or bullets of a weight below 400 grammes (approximately 
fourteen ounces) which were explosive or which contained "fulminating 
or inflammable substances." 16 At the time of the Declaration, such bul-
lets would have caused more serious wounds and a greater probability 
of death to troops against whom they \vere used than would the non-
explosive bullets then in use. After the development of flying vehicles for 
military purposes, it became apparent that such projectiles had great 
military efficiency and they have been used in aerial warfare starting with 
the First World War.17 
The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 have been examined from 
the standpoint of the combatant status of submarine warships.18 Another 
significant aspect of the Conferences concerns the treatment of aerial 
bombardment. This subject is particularly suitable for brief examination 
here because the strategic bombardment capability of the modern fleet 
ballistic missile submarine is one contemporary method of conducting 
aerial bombardment. 
Although the 1899 Conference was not successful in "abolishing" sub-
marines, it produced a Declaration concerning aerial bombardment which 
provided: 
The Contracting Powers agree to prohibit, for a term of five years, 
, the launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons, or by other 
new methods of a similar nature.19 
The balloon had not been used for the launching of projectiles or explo-
. sives although it had been employed in war for purposes of observation. 
Neither the free nor the captive balloon could be controlled in a way 
which made it likely to be an efficient bombing instrumentality. Con-
12 The Declaration is set forth in the text of Ch. IV accompanying note 32. 
13 Colombos 471-72. 
u 1 Savage, Policy of the United States Toward Maritime Commerce in War 
394, 395 (Dept. of State 1934). 
15 Text in 2 Dept. of the Army, International Law 40 (Pamphlet 27-161- 2; 1962). 
16 Ibid. Larger explosive or shrapnel projectiles were not prohibited. 
17 Royse 144. 
18 See the text of Ch. II accompanying notes 11-24. 
19 2 Scott 153. 
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sequently, its use could be prohibited for a time without imposing a mili-
tary detriment upon any of the major powers. These considerations were 
persuasive in bringing about the unanimous vote for a temporary inter-
diction of it as an instrument of aerial bombardment.20 
The "other new methods of a similar nature" referred to in the Dec-
laration were of particular significance. Since the Wright brothers' 
heavier-than-air flight experiments were not successful until 1903, it seems 
probable that this reference to new methods concerned lighter-than-air 
dirigibles. The interdiction of aerial bombardment proposed by Russia 
had been at a time when Russian dirigible efforts had failed but experi-
ments conducted by other states were being successful in varying degrees. 21 
Since the dirigible could be maneuvered and controlled, except in un-
favorable weather conditions involving high winds, it could probably 
become an efficient aerial bombing vehicle. This prospective technical 
improvement in dirigibles was the principal reason for changing the 
original Russian proposal of permanent interdiction to a five-year term. 22 
During the five-year period, there was no inhibition upon further experi-
ments with dirigibles and the matter of "new methods" of aerial bombing 
could be considered again after the expiration of the term in 1904. 
The Hague Conference of 1907 met in an atmosphere which was not 
conducive to the restriction of efficient weapons. 23 In addition, substantial 
technical improvements had been made in dirigibles. 24 A number of the 
major European military powers had such "airships" in use. In Germany, 
the famous Count Zeppelin was demonstrating their technical capabilities.25 
France had an airship program second to none. 26 Although it had no 
actual wartime experience to its credit, it was becoming clear that the 
dirigible airship had significant military potential. Like the balloon, it 
had a weight-lifting ability but it had the added advantage of being able 
to direct its bombs to a particular military objective. The airship's then 
relatively great altitude capability and the lack of antiaircraft guns and 
other surface-to-air weapons made it almost immune from ground attack. 
It should also be mentioned that the heavier-than-air airplane was in 
such a primitive stage of development that its subsequent effectiveness . as 
an antiairship device was not then foreseen. 
In the military context just described, the minor military powers joined-
with Great Britain in favoring a renewal of the 1899 ban on aerial born-
20 1 id. 65,1. 
21 Royse 39. 
2a Id. at 40. 
23 I d. at 54-55. 
24 Id. at 56-59. 
25 I d. at 63-64. 
26 I d. at 67-68. 
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bardment. 27 The British correctly foresaw the de facto end of their mili-
tary advantages based on their geographical situation as an island, and 
the smaller powers with comparatively inadequate scientific capabilities 
recognized that the major powers would quickly achieve superiority in 
airships. The continental powers, and in particular France and Germany, 
were eager to retain and improve the ai·rship. 28 The result \vas that no 
limitations were placed upon aerial bombardment. 
The lack of restrictions upon aerial bombardment at the 1907 Confer-
ence gave at least some indication that the airship and the heavier-than-air 
aircraft would be accorded status as lawful combatant units in future war 
or hostilities. Such status was subsequently established beyond any doubt. 29 
As shown in Chapter II, the lawful combatant status of the submarine 
warship has been firmly established after a long decisional process. Thus 
in the present century combatant units which have been found to function 
with military efficiency in relativel-y new warfare environments, the air 
and under the sea, have been accorded lawful status.30 
Dr. Royse has accurately summarized the results of attempted weapons 
limitation at the Hague Conferences. 
Such destructive weapons, fot instance, as the high explosive shell, the 
shrapnel, mines or torpedoes, were retained as legitimate means of 
warfare, whereas the inefficient expanding and explosive bullets 
were condemned along with the perfectly useless free balloons. The 
proceedings of the Hague Conference[ s] demonstrate rather that a 
weapon will be restricted in inverse proportion, more or less, to its 
effectiveness; that the more efficient a weapon or method of warfare 
the less likelihood there is of its being restricted in action by rules of 
war. 31 
Unfortunately, this analysis does not provide a realistic basis for a favor-
able prediction concerning present and future weapons abolition or limi-
tation. The tremendous capabilities of modern weapons of mass destruc-
tion, however, make the objective of their effectively sanctioned abolition 
much more urgent now than was weapons abolition at the time of the 
Hague Conferences. Until this objective is reached the juridical control 
of such weapons remains a vital goal.32 
~ Id. at 59, 66. 
~ ld. at 67. 
29 Spaight 76-1 07 considers the "combatant quality" or status of aircraft. 
30 "Objects" carrying weapons in space are prohibited by art. 4 of the United 
Nations draft Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explora-
tion and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Text 
in 55 Dept. of State Bull. 952, 953 (Dec. 26, 1966). 
31 Royse 131 - 32. 
33 
See the recommendation concerning disarmament 1n the Preface to this study. 
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B. CLAIMS CONCERNING WEAPONS OF ATTACK IN 
GENERAL WAR 
In appraising juridical control of weapons of attack it is necessary to 
distinguish between the claims concerning the legality of particular weap-
ons per se and the related claims concerning the legality of the use of the 
weapons. It is clear that a weapon (or a combatant unit) otherwise legal 
can be employed in an illegal manner. 33 
It is probably accurate to state that the juridical criteria which has 
been developed to determine the lawfulness of particular weapons is based 
upon both the principles of military necessity and of humanity. 34 In the 
application of this criteria, however, the principle of humanity is usually 
considered only after the principle of military necessity is given controlling 
weight. The result is, in general, that only weapons which cause destruc-
tion and injury which is unnecessary for the attainment of military objec-
tives are deemed unlawful. 
Professor Hyde stresses the role of military decision in stating the "under-
lying legal principle" in determining the lawfulness of weapons: 
The task of specification is primarily a military rather than a legal 
one, calling for technical opinion whether the blows to be inflicted 
by new instrumentalities such as those designed and employed in the 
course of World War I possess a military value which outweighs in 
significance the severity and magnitude of the suffering caused by 
their use and likely to be incidentally felt by non-combatants. 35 
In a comparable formulation of the basic criteria, Professor Garner 
states: 
The employment of new and powerful inventions of destruction or 
of new methods is, of course, not to be condemned and ruled out 
merely because they are new or because they are more effective than 
those formerly employed, as a few sentimentalists in every age have 
wished to do. The true test of their lawfulness is rather whether they 
can he· employed without inflicting superfluous injury upon those 
against whom they are employed, whether they "uselessly aggravate 
the sufferings of disabled men," whether their effect is cruel and in-
humane, and the like. 36 
Dr. Spaight has also set forth the same accepted criteria in an unusually 
blunt formulation: 
It is really by its fruits that the engine of war is judged. The test 
33 The appraisal in Ch. II, for example, was restricted to the submarine's com-
batant status and left open the issues relating to the lawfulness of its various uses. 
34 Dr. Royse refers to the same principles functionally as "utilitarian grounds" and 
"social sanction." Royse 13 7 and passim. 
35 Hyde 1814. 
36 1 Garner 282. Prof. Garner argued the unlawfulness of particular uses of German 
submarines in World War I but did not question their lawful combatant status. I d. 
at 355-83. 
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of lawfulness of any weapon or projectile is practically the answer 
one can give to the question-What is its "bag"? Does it disable so 
many of the enemy that the military end thus gained condones the 
suffering it causes? 37 
Th~ criteria for a weapon to meet the test of lawfulness may be sum-
marized by stating that it must not cause a destruction of values which 
is disproportionate to the military advantage gained thr-ough its use. 38 
The historical experience in applying the criteria appears to indicate that 
weapons will be upheld as lawful except where there is a great disparity 
between the ensuing destruction of values and the military advantage 
gained. An obvious example of illegal weapon use would be a delayed 
action bomb which is dropped by an aircraft during the war but explodes, 
killing and wounding civilians, after the war has ended. 
Conventional rules elucidate, but do not appear to change, the custom-
ary law criteria stated by the writers.- The Regulations Annexed to Hague 
Convention IV ( 1907), for example, provide that it is especially forbidden 
"to employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary 
suffering." 39 Since it is clear that the use of all efficient weapons of war 
causes human suffering, this conventional rule should be interpreted rea-
sonably as prohibiting only that suffering which is "unnecessary" in relation 
to the military advantage derived from the use of the weapon. The U.S. 
Army's official publication on land warfare law provides helpful inter-
pretation: 
What weapons cause "unnecessary in jury" can only be determined 
in the light of the practice of States in refraining from the use of a 
given weapon because it is believed to have that effect.40 
There is little or no indication in "the practice of States" that efficient 
weapons which bring substantial net military advantage of their belligerent 
users have not been used because of ancillary injury and suffering caused 
to the enemy belligerent. In the instances where efficient weapons have 
nqt been used it is probable that other reasons have existed such as the 
potential threat of the use of the same weapon by the enemy and con-
sequent doubts as to its net military advantage.41 
1. Traditional Naval Weapons 
The appraisal under the present heading examines the lawfulness 
of traditional weapons and excludes consideration of weapons with mass 
destruction capabilities. Early naval warfare often involved the maneuver-
37 Spaight, Wa r R igh ts on L and 76-77 ( 1911 ) . 
38 See the statement of the test by Prof. McDougal and Dr. Feliciano quoted in the 
tex t accompanying infra note 128. 
39 Art. 23 (e ) . Art. 22 of the same Regulations provides this general admonition: 
"T he right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited." 
40 Law of L and W arfare paragraph 34 (b). ' 
41 E.g. the nonuse of gas weapons in combat in World War II. 
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ing of warships with the object of boarding enemy vessels and capturing 
them through procedures which included hand-to-hand combat. 42 An 
interesting early form of chemical weapon for use in naval warfare, "Greek 
fire," was invented about 600 B.C.43 Its significant characteristic was that 
it burst into flames spontaneously upon contact with water. Apparently 
the destruction of values involved in its use was not considered dispropor-
tionate to its efficiency. 
Guns, torpedoes, and mines are among the most traditiona! naval 
weapons which are still in use and they have been employed by surface 
and submarine warships alike. 44 Their legality appears to have been simply 
assumed rather than argued. The muzzle loading naval gun dealt terrible 
destruction to the opposing enemy in the days of sailing warships, but its 
efficiency apparently justified it juridically. It is well known that the naval 
gun and its projectiles have been greatly improved in range, accuracy, 
and destructive power in the present century. Thus the long-range guns 
firing projectiles weighing about one ton which were used at Jutland and 
at Surigao Strait destroyed enemy capital ships and killed and wounded 
enemy personnel. No question was raised concerning their lawfulness. Had 
such questions been raised, they would have been rejected because of the 
undoubted military efficiency of the guns. 
The torpedoes which were immortalized by Admiral Farragut at Mobile 
Bay were stationary explosive devices. 45 Hague Convention VIII ( 1907) 
recognized generally the lawful status of self-propelled torpedoes by for-
bidding the use of such torpedoes which "do not become harmless when 
they have missed their mark." 46 In both World Wars torpedoes were 
high-speed devices with high-explosive warheads which could be accurately 
aimed at the selected object of attack. They constituted the principal 
armament of submarines and their legality as weapons was not chal-
lenged. 47 During the Second World War the Japanese developed and used 
a much larger and more efficient torpedo than those generally in use at 
the time. It was termed a "Kaiten" or "long lance torpedo" and may be 
described accurately as either a large torpedo or a small submarine manned 
by a single crewman who guided the device to the target and was ~illed. 
42 See Potter & Nimitz 1-20. 
43 Report of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Research in CBR 
(Chemical~ Biological~ and Radiological Warfare)~ H.R. Rep. No. 815, 86th Cong., 
1st Sess., 3 (1959). 
44 The naval aspects of weapons considered in the textual paragraph are based 
upon Potter & Nimitz passim. 
45 The words attributed to the Admiral are: "Damn the torpedoes! Full steam 
ahead!" The Admiral stated that he sought guidance through prayer. Potter & 
Nimitz 320. 
46 Art. 1, paragraph 3. The text of the Convention is in 2 Scott 428. 
47 The lawfulness of some of their selected objects of attack was, of course, chal-
lenged as indicated in Ch. IV passim. -
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tn the ensuing explosion.48 Even though it carried a larger explosive 
charge and created greater destruction than smaller torpedoes, its law-
fulness was assured because its destructiveness was not disparate in relation 
to its military efficiency. By the same reasoning, the British midget sub-
marines or "X-craft" which carried out successful attacks upon the German 
battleship Tirpitz 49 are lawful whether they are regarded as weapons or 
as submarine combatant units. 
The military efficiency of the automatic sea mine was demonstrated 
during the Russo-Japanese War shortly before the opening of the Hague 
Conference of 1907.50 The British delegation to this Conference initially 
proposed a total interdiction against the use of unanchored mines but 
later retreated to a more moderate position and, although expressing grave 
doubts about it,51 adhered to the ensuing Convention. The German delega-
tion regarded the mine as a necessary and efficient instrument of warfare. 52 
Hague Convention VIII provides in part: 
It is forbidden to lay automatic contact mines off the coast and 
ports of the enemy, with the sole object of intercepting commercial 
shipping.53 
It was always possible, of course, for a belligerent employing mine 
warfare to claim that the mines were laid for additional purposes beyond 
that of intercepting commercial shipping. The ineffectiveness of the con-
ventional provision was demonstrated by the experience in both World 
Wars where mines caused great destruction of human and material values. 
Mines were scattered off enemy coasts and were systematically employed 
in minefields and mine barrages. 54 The most notable example of the latter 
was the great North Sea Mine Barrage laid by the United States which 
has been referred to previously. 55 Mines were also employed in both World 
Wars as an ancillary method of enforcing submarine operational areas. 
Hague Convention VIII provides further that anchored automatic con-
tact mines must be so constructed as to become harmless when they have 
broken from their moorings 56 and that similar unanchored mines must 
be cqnstructed so as to become harmless within an hour of their Ia unch-
ta The technical statements concerning the "Kaiten" are based upon Yokota & 
Harrington, Suicide Submarine! ( 1962); Yokota & Harrington, "Kaiten-Japan's 
Human Torpedoes," 88 Nav. Inst. Proc. No.1, p. 55 (1962). 
49 Factual description appears in Wilkinson, "Tirpitz Tale," 80 Nav. Inst. Proc. 
375 (1954). 
50 Potter & Nimitz 354. 
51 1 Scott 581, 585-86. 
52 I d. at 586-87. 
53 Art. 2. 
54 See e.g. Potter & Nimitz 456, 470. 
55 See the text of Ch. III accompanying note 62. 
66 Art. 1, paragraph 2. 
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ing.57 It is clear that the military efficiency of uncontrolled mines which 
are drifting about is doubtful since they might do substantial harm to the 
launching belligerent as well as to the enemy belligerent. There is no doubt 
that drifting mines subjected neutral shipping to hazards and damage 
which continued after the conclusion of active hostilities.58 This continu-
ing sea-mine danger in time of peace demonstrated violation of these 
conventional law doctrines. 
Sea mines, like other traditional naval weapons, have undergone con-
tinuing technical improvement. In the Second World War acoustic and 
magnetic mines, among other types, were employed. 59 None of these 
technological improvements have deprived sea mines of their status as 
lawful weapons since their increased destructiveness is not disproportionate 
to their military efficiency. 
2. Traditional Naval Bombardment 
Surface warships are the typical vessels which conduct traditional 
bombardment but submarines with deck-mounted guns have a bombard-
ment capability. 60 The conventional rules concerning naval bombardment 
of objects of attack located upon land are formulated in Hague Conven-
tion IX Respecting Bombardments by Naval Forces in Time of War 
( 1907) .61 The first article prohibits the bombardment by naval forces 
of undefended places. Article 2, however, provides for a substantial modifi-
cation of the prohibition: 
Military works, military or naval establishments, depots of arms or 
war materiel, workshops or plant which could be utilized for the 
needs of the hostile fleet or army, and the ships of war in the harbor, 
are not, however, included in this prohibition. 62 
Thus, military objectives could be bombarded lawfully even though located 
in undefended towns and ports. In bombarding such undefended locations 
the naval commander was required to "take all due measures in order 
that the town may suffer as little harm as possible." 63 In summary, these 
conventional doctrines embody the test of the lawful military objective 
which is based upon the primacy of factors of military efficiency. ,The 
57 Art. 1, paragraph 1. 
68 Reference is made to such hazards following the Russo-Japanese War in 6 
Hackworth 503. 
59 Roskill 47-48, 117, 379. 
60 The t;luee largest pre-World War II U.S. Navy submarines, the Argonaut, 
Narwhal, and Nautilus, each mounted two 6-inch guns (the same size typical 
of light cruisers). Parkes (ed.), fane's Fighting Ships 1934 493. Shore bombard-
ment by the Nautilus during World War II is described in Potter & Nimitz 799. 
61 Text in 2 Scott 436. 
62 Art. 2, paragraph 1. 
63 Art. 2, paragraph 3. 
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humanitarian factors involved in the concept of "undefended places" are 
given, at best, subordinate consideration. 
Since Hague Convention IX did not specifically provide for the situation 
concerning defended places, it seems clear that even the modest limitations 
upon the naval bombardment of undefended places do not apply to places 
which are defended. In modern combat situations where a coastal state 
has some military air power, it is likely to be assumed that the state is 
defended. 
In the juridical application of Hague Convention IX in both World 
Wars, defended land areas were lawful objects of attack. As a practical 
matter, of course, they could not be bombarded unless they were within 
the range of naval gunfire. 64 If the places on land were undefended, they 
were also lawful objects of attack providing that the military objectives 
referred to in article 2 of the Convention could be identified as targets. 
In this latter situation, harm to the civilian population which was inciden-
tal to the attack upon the lawful military objective was not prohibited. 
During the Second World War in both the Pacific and European theatres 
Allied naval gun power was employed as an effective part of the great 
amphibious attacks upon enemy-defended locations.65 
3. Biological and Chemical Weapons 
The principal weapons of the fleet ballistic missile submarine are 
Polaris missiles with the capability of carrying warheads containing either 
traditional explosives or nuclear or thermonuclear explosives.66 Since these 
are the typical weapons, they may be regarded mistakenly as the only wea-
pons of these submarines. General Rothschild, however, has written: 
As far as missiles are concerned, it is obvious to anyone with an 
acquaintance with toxic munitions, and who has seen a picture of 
a Polaris, that it could carry biological, and possibly cherrucal, 
agents.67 
Chemical warfare and biological warfare have been defined as follows: 
Chemical warfare is the intentional employment of toxic gases, 
liquids, or solids to produce casualties, and the use of screening smoke 
M For example, the U.S.S. Colorado _, a battleship which participated in ten major 
amphibious operations in the Pacific War, had a main battery of eight 16-inch guns. 
These · guns had a maximum range of 33,300 yards. Parkes, op. cit. supra note 60 
at 467. 
65 See Potter & Nimitz 745-48 and passim. 
66 These weapons are described in the text of Ch. I accompanying notes 39- 40. 
67 
Rothschild, Tomorrow's Weapons : Chemical and Biological xiv (1964). Prior 
to his retirement, General Rothschild was Commanding General, U.S. Army Chemi-
cal Corps Research and Development Command. I d . at xi. The same writer refers 
also to other U.S. Navy chemical warfare capabilities. I d. at 78. 
162 
or incendiaries. Biological warfare is the military use of living orga-
nisms or their toxic products to cause death, disability, or damage 
to man, his domestic animals, or crops. 68 
An unusual feature of a biological weapon is that its first impact is 
designed to lead to successive ones. 69 Thus, a germ weapon which leads 
to a mass epidemic is like fire in that it is self-propagating. It is also like 
fire in that it does not distinguish between belligerent users of the weapon, 
the opposing belligerents, and neutrals among its victims. It is probably 
much less subject to effective military control by its belligerent user than 
is fire. Because of this, it is necessary to question the net military advantage 
to the belligerent user of a weapon which may inflict devastating injury 
upon friend and foe alike. While such biological weapons may be "efficient" 
in the sense of causing indiscriminate mass destruction, that efficiency 
which is relied upon as a factor in establishing the lawfulness of a weapon 
is military efficacy in the controlled destruction of lawful military objec-
tives. In addition, it is clear that weapons which make civilians direct 
objects of attack are unlawful. 70 
The Hague Conference of 1899 agreed to a Declaration concerning 
chemical warfare which provided: 
The Contracting Powers agree to abstain from the use of projectiles 
the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious 
gases.71 
The gases referred to are now recognized to be but a part of the com-
prehensive arsenal of chemical warfare. At the time the Declaration was 
adopted there had been no adequate experimentation much less use, con-
cerning gas shells, and the action of the Conference, consequently, was 
taken without knowledge as to whether the destructiveness caused by gas 
shells would be in excess of that necessary to attain a lawful military ob-
jective. Captain Mahan has indicated the inadequacy of the knowledge 
on the subject.72 
The military effectiveness of poison gas was demonstrated during the 
First World War. 73 Even though this chemical weapon presents some of the 
same problems concerning indiscriminate destruction as do biological weap-
ons, it seems probable that chemical weapons are more controllable than 
biological ones. 
68 Op. cit. supra note 43 at 3. 
69 See e.g. the hypothetical biological warfare attack upon the United States where 
the weapons are assumed to be launched from submarines. It is described in the 
[Washington] Evening Star, Feb. 9, 1967, A-12, cols. 1-7. 
70 See the criteria quoted in the text accompanying infra note 128. 
11 Text in 2 Scott 155. 
72 Scott ( ed.), The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences: The Conference 
of 1899 283 ( 1920). 
73 Op. cit. supra note 43 at 3-4. 
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In initiating the use of gas in land warfare in 1915 Germany avoided 
the precise wording of the Hague Declaration by disseminating the gas 
through canisters fixed to the ground with favorable wind conditions being 
relied upon to direct the gas against the enemy.74 The Allied Powers 
retaliated in kind, and before long gas attacks were carried out by the use 
of cylinders and bombs as well as by the projectiles forbidden by the 
Hague Declaration.75 In addition to the claims of legal right, reprisals 
were invoked by both sides. 76 By the end of the war gas attacks were in 
common use, although ·regarded with considerable reprobation except 
when used against the enemy. 77 
At the end of World War I gas weapons were abolished for the defeated 
powers. The Treaty of Versailles with Germany, for example, provided 
in relevant part: 
The use of asphyxiating, poisonous 'or other gases and all analogous 
liquids, materials or devices being prohibited, their manufacture and 
importation are strictly forbidden in Germany.78 
Similar prohibitions were placed in the other peace treaties. 79 
The principal attempt to abolish gas as a weapon is set forth in the 
Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, 
Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare 
( 1925) . 80 This Gas Protocol, using language substantially identical to that 
in the unratified Washington Treaty in Relation to the Use of Submarines 
and Noxious Gases in Warfare ( 1922) , 81 provides : 
Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, 
and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly 
condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world ... 82 
The parties to the Gas Protocol agreed to "accept the prohibition" and 
also agreed "to extend this prohibition to the use of bacteriological meth-
ods of warfare .... " 83 Most of the great powers, except the United 
States and Japan, became parties to the Gas Protocol. 
7
' 1 Garner 272. 
75 I d. at 272-73. 
76 I d. at 2 73. 
77 The propaganda and psychological attitudes of the time concerning the use of 
gas, and submarines as well, are described in Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in 
the World War 111-12 (1927). 
78 Art. 171. 
79 The Treaty of St. Germain with Austria, art. 135; the Treaty of Trianon with 
Hungary, art. 119; the Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria, art. 82; the Treaty of 
Sevres with Turkey, art. 1 76. The cited treaties appear in 1 & 2 Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace, The Treaties of Peace 1919- 1923 (1924). 
80 Text in 3 Hudson, International Legislation 16 70 ( 1931) . 
81 Art. 5. Text in Wash. Conf. 888. ' 
82 Op. cit. supra note 80 at 1671. 
83 
Ibid. The Gas Protocol does not provide for any inspection procedures. 
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There is convincing evidence that Fascist Italy used gas warfare against 
primitively armed tribesmen during the attack upon Ethiopia.84 There is 
also evidence that Japan used it from time to time against the Chinese.85 
It is usually stated that gas warfare was not employed during the Second 
World War. This statement is accurate if it is interpreted as restricted to 
the use of gas in combat situations. During the war, President Roosevelt 
indicated that the United States would not employ gas warfare unless it 
was first used by the Axis Powers. 86 Since both sides had a substantial 
chemical warfare capability, it is probable that the Axis Powers could not 
foresee a net military advantage in using gas. The result was an effective 
deterrence of the use of gas weapons 87 not unlike the present deterrence 
of the use of nuclear weapons. 
The Nazi murder of millions of innocent men, women, and children 
is one of the most terrible and tragic events in history. It is well known 
that poison gas was one of the principal weapons used in perpetrating 
these crimes against victims who were regarded as "inferior'' in the Nazi 
ideology. The reports of the various war crimes tribunals are replete with 
the details of these atrocities. 88 
Chemical and biological weapons, along with nuclear ones, comprise 
the principal instruments of mass destruction in the contemporary arsenal 
for total war. The nerve gases, developed by Germany during the Second 
World War, are among the most significant in the current chemical war-
fare stockpiles. 89 They include Tabun (GA) and Sarin (GB). Less than 
a minute of exposure to either of these gases is fatal and casualties are 
created before the presence of the gas can be detected. 90 They penetrate 
the body mechanism either through inhalation or by liquid drops which 
enter through the skin and disrupt nerve signals to the muscles.91 
It may not be assumed accurately that the chemical and biological 
arsenal only comprises weapons of lethal characteristics. It also includes 
weapons which are only temporarily disabling. A riot-control device such 
s. Op. cit. supra note 43 at 4. 
85 Ibid. 
86 See 8 Dept. of State Bull. 507 ( 1943). 
87 Prof. Schelling regards the nonuse of gas in World War II as enforced by the 
threat of reciprocal use: Arms and Influence 131 (1966). 
88 See e.g. 1 I.M.T. 251-53; United States v. Ohlendorf ("The Einsatzgruppen 
Case"), 4 Trials of War Crims. 1, 199, 213; United States v. Brandt ("The Medical 
Case"), 1 Trials of War Crims. 1, 314-54 (this case involved "medical"experiments 
with gas used upon the victims) ; The Zyklon B Case ("Trial of Tesch"), 1 Reps. 
U.N. Comm. 93. 
89 Op. cit. supra note 67 at 32-35. 
00 Op. cit. supra note 43 at 6. 
en Ibid. Description of the clinical symptoms appear in ibid. 
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as tear gas is a well-known example. 92 Whether in a general war or in 
a limited one, it is obviously more humanitarian to disable guerrilla troops 
who are located in a cave or a similar position by the use of tear gas rather 
than to incinerate them with a flamethrower. 
General Rothschild recommends the use of gas warfare for humanitarian 
reasons as well as for military ones. Referring specifically to the United 
States amphibious attack upon Betio Island, Tarawa Atoll in 1943, he 
emphasizes the almost complete destruction of the defending Japanese forces 
and the heavy casualties among U.S. Marines. 93 These casualties among 
the attackers took place in spite of the tremendous aerial and gunfire 
bombardment preceding the landing. General Rothschild states that a gas 
warfare attack upon Betio would 'have drastically reduced both United 
States and Japanese casualties. In his view, many "more [Japanese] proba-
bly would have lived and recovered tompletely, following gas attacks" 
even if mustard gas had been used. 94 He inquires: 
In figh ~ing without toxic [chemical] weapons, then, we are being 
humane to whom? To the Americans who were killed or wounded 
unnecessarily? To the Japanese who were killed almost to a man by 
being burned out of their shelters with flame throwers, or forced out 
with white phosphorous grenades or hand grenades so they could be 
shot? 95 
The sources of the doctrines concerning the control of biological and 
chemical warfare comprise both conventional and customary law. The 
principal conventional source is, of course, the Geneva Gas Protocol ( 1925) 
which prohibits the initial use of biological and chemical warfare between 
the adhering states. A significant issue concerning customary international 
law as a source of relevant doctrines must be considered. Has the Gas 
Protocol been accepted as customary law so that all states, including those 
which did not adhere to it, are now forbidden the initial use of chemical 
warfare? Based upon the substantial nonuse of chemical warfare in com-
bat situations since the conclusion of the First World War, Professor 0'-
Brien has made a careful argument that there now exists customary law 
binding upon all states which forbids the first use of such warfare.96 There 
9a A brief description is provided in op. cit. supra note 43 at 6, paragraph 4. 
Defoliation agents come under the heading of chemicals but are harmless to 
humans. 
93 Op. cit. supra note 67 at 4-5. 
9
• I d. at 5. 
95 Ibid. Statistics which indicate a higher rate of survival in World War I among 
troops injured by gas than among those injured by other weapons appear in op. cit. 
supra note 43 at 4, paragraph 1. 
96 O'Brien, "Biological/Chemical Warfare and the International Law of War," 51 
Ceo. L.]. 1, 32-36 ( 1962). 
Prof. Tucker states generally that there is a customary rule prohibiting poison 
gas. Tucker 52. He considers weapons in id. at 50-55. 
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is no doubt as to the desirability of this conclusion concerning the existence 
of a comprehensive prohibition based upon the customary law. Unfortun-
ately, there is serious doubt as to whether or not the nonuse of gas relied 
upon indicates customary lawmaking. It seems more probable that it re-
flects rather the common conviction of belligerents as to the lack of net 
military advantage in employing chemical weapons in situations where 
these are possessed by both sides. 97 
The Gas Protocol also prohibits the use of "bacteriological methods of 
warfare." 98 It is clear, therefore, that the first use of biological warfare 
is also prohibited as between the adherents to the Gas Protocol. It is rather 
difficult, however, to attempt to make a customary law argument based 
upon the nonuse of biological warfare analogous to that which Professor 
O'Brien has made concerning chemical warfare. One reason is that bio-
logical warfare has not been used at all. Its nonuse since the Gas Protocol 
in 1925, consequently, cannot be claimed with much conviction to demon-
strate the development of applicable customary law. The result of this is 
that the first use of biological warfare is prohibited only to the states which 
adhere to the Gas Protocol. 
The contemporary situation may be summarized by stating that there 
is a conventional and possibly also a customary prohibition upon the first 
use of chemical warfare and a conventional prohibition only upon the 
first use of biological warfare. As Professor O'Brien has demonstrated, 
these prohibitions are more apparent than effective. 99 There are convinc-
ing reasons which support this conclusion of the lack of effectiveness or 
sanction of the prohibitions. For example, there are apparently substantial 
stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons. In addition, there is no 
limitation upon scientific inquiry and development of these weapons in 
the existing doctrines. There are, indeed, no inspection procedures what-
soever to implement the Geneva Gas Protocol. In this context, peaceful 
states which neglect research and development in biological and chemical 
weapons for both defensive and offensive purposes act at their peril.100 
97 Prof. O'Brien recognizes some of the considerations stated in the text but he 
regards them as consistent with customary lawmaking in this situation. O'Brien, op. 
cit. supra note 96. 
98 The context of the quoted words is indicated in the text accompanying supra 
notes 82-83. 
00 O'Brien, op. cit. supra note 96 at 55-56. 
100 Description and criticism of such research and development appears in Langer, 
"Chemical and Biological Warfare (I) : The Research Program," 155 Science (pub. 
of the Amer. Assoc. for the Advancement of Science) 174 (Jan. 13, 1967); Langer, 
"Chemical and Biological Warfare (II) : The Weapons and the Policies," 155 id. 
299 (Jan. 20, 1967). The concern of some scientists about the subject as expressed · 
in a petition to President Johnson states, in part: "The employment of any one CB 
weapon weakens the barriers to the use of others." I d. at 302. See also the inserted 
comment entitled "University of Pennsylvania: It's Hard to Kick the Habit." I d. at 
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The neglect of such research and development could result in placing the 
most peaceful states in the world community at the mercy of the least 
peaceful ones.101 
The relevant prohibitions upon the use of biological and chemical war-
fare extend, as stated above, only to an interdiction of the first use of 
these weapons. This interpretation is required by the availability of the 
doctrines of legitimate reprisal which legalize the use of otherwise unlaw-
ful weapons in response to the prior use of such weapons. Where a bio-
logical or a chemical weapon is used illegally in violation of the applicable 
doctrines, it seems clear that the use of these weapons, or either of them, 
in retaliation could be justified juridically as legitimate reprisals.102 This 
assumes, of course, that the retaliatory use is directed and controlled and 
does not involve militarily meaningless mass destruction. 
4. Nuclear Weapons 
a. THE LAWFULNESS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
In the foregoing subheadings and in the ensuing text the word 
"nuclear" is used broadly to cover both nuclear and thermonuclear weap-
ons except where a distinction is made between them explicitly or through 
the context. It is a commonplace observation that a nuclear weapon, 
because of its massive destructive capability, is not "just another weapon." 
Such a basic energy weapon involves the very rapid release of a tremendous 
amount of energy within a small space by the fission or fusion of atomic 
nuclei.103 It is difficult to conceive the force and ensuing damage from 
the resulting explosions which may now be produced. All individuals who 
cherish moral values, and human life itself, must be appalled by the de-
structiveness of these weapons. A useful explanation in relatively non-
technical language of the blast and other effects involved appears in the 
latest revision of The Effects of Nuclear Weapons. 104 
The legal scholar who values human dignity and consensual as opposed 
to coercive procedures has a particular obligation to attempt to advance 
the effective legal control of these weapons. Unless international lawyers 
provide constructive leadership in solving this central challenge of our 
177. The University of Pennsylvania responded to the pressure campaign against 
chemical and biological research contracts with the U.S. Government by giving 
them up. See "Snice Rack and Summit: A Season's Discontent over Classified Re-
search," 65 Pennsylvania Gazette No.7, p. 14 ( 1967). 
101 See generally Stowell, "The Laws of War and the Atomic Bomb," 39 A.j.I.L. 
784 ( 1945). 
102 See Prof. O'Brien's treatment of reprisals in this context : op. cit . supra note 96 
at 43-49, 58-59. 
103 Nuclear explosions are the result of fission and thermonuclear ones are the 
result of fusion. 
10
j U.S. Dept. of Defense, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (rev. ed. 1962). 
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times, the result could be the destruction of human life and social pro-
cesses on a massive scale. 
The present appraisal focuses narrowly upon the issue of the lawfuless 
of nuclear weapons per se. Subsequent appraisal will conisider the issues 
involved in determining the lawfulness of some of the uses of these weapons. 
Their capability of mass destruction 105 and other characteristics must 
compel humanitarians to wish devoutly that they may be accurately char-
acterized as illegal. One should not, however, summarily appraise these 
weapons as "unlawful" without consideration of the several relevant issues 
including, for example, the availability of sanctions to make the appraisal 
meaningful. 
Some international lawyers, acting upon humanitarian motives, have 
attempted to declare the existing illegality of nuclear weapons. These 
lawyers have placed heavy reliance upon certain international conventions 
as well as general principles of customary international law. Since the con-
ventions and principles which are invoked long preceded the existence, 
or even the serious contemplation, of nuclear weapons, the arguments 
to support the claim of illegality must necessarily employ analogy and 
extrapolation. 
The St. Petersburg Declaration ( 1868) prohibiting the use of weapons 
"which would uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render 
their death inevitable" 106 is one of the conventions relied upon. Another 
conventional formulation which is functionally similar to the first clause 
of the Declaration appears in the Hague Regulations ( 1907). It especially 
prohibits the use of "arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause 
unnecessary suffering." 107 Both of these provisions are usually interpreted 
as manifestations of the basic principle requiring a reasonable proportion-
ality between the military efficiency of the weapon and the ancillary 
destruction of human values. Dr. Singh, however, reasons that even if 
the other destructive effects of nuclear weapons explosions are not con-
sidered, nuclear radiation combined with the radioactive fallout come 
within the quoted prohibition in the Hague Regulations.108 Perhaps the 
100 In a single strike, naval aircraft could exceed, by several times, the weapon 
power delivered by more than 204,000 offensive naval air sorties during three 
years of the Korean War. Indeed, on a single modern carrier, in the space of a 
few steps, one could walk about and pat the lethal warheads of weapons whose 
destructive power exceeded all the ordnance the U.S. Navy had exploded in its 
entire history. 
Cagle, "A Philosophy for Naval Atomic Warfare," 83 Nav. lnst. Proc. 249, 251 
( 195 7). 
Nef, War and Human Progress~ 254 ( 1950) warns against the illusory view that 
more frightful weapons of destruction might impose limits on war. 
106 Text in Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land Warfare 315 ( 1959); 2 Dept. of 
the Army, International Law 40 (Pamphlet No. 27-171-2; 1962). 
107 Art. 23 (e) . 
108 Singh, Nuclear Weapons and International Law 150-52 ( 1959). 
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principal inadequacy of this argument is that it does not include a demon-
stration that the use of these weapons results necessarily in the destruction 
of human values which is out of all proportion to their military efficiency. 
In order to be persuasive, such a demonstration should extend to the 
varying factual contexts of future coercive situations involving the use 
of nuclear weapons including the magnitude of the explosions and the 
character of the objects of attack. 
The second clause of the St. Petersburg Declaration refers to rendering 
the death of disabled men "inevitable." Professor McDougal and Dr. Feli-
ciano have pointed out that this conventional rule does not prohibit 
weapons which kill as opposed to those which only wound since all weapons, 
including the bow and arrow for example, can under certain conditions 
render death inevitable.109 Dr. Spaight, however, as one aspect of an 
argument which concludes that nuclear weapons are illegal, suggests that 
this reference is to weapons which have the effect of leaving the wounded 
victim "with no hope of survival." 110 It has been accurately pointed out 
that the presence or absence of "hope of survival" by an individual depends 
upon a number of variables in the specific factual context including the 
gravity of the particular injury and the ready availability of medical ser-
vices.111 These factors are operative whether the in juries involved result 
from gunfire, radiation, or other causes. 
Dr. Schwarzenberger, who also places his analysis upon basic humani-
tarian considerations, has reached the same conclusion that nuclear weap-
ons are illegal.112 While he relies upon other rules as well, he puts principal 
emphasis upon the customary and conventional doctrines which prohibit 
the use of poison and poisoned weapons. The "true ratio legis," 113 in his 
view, is that radiation and poison are substantially the same thing. He 
states: 
[A] fairly strong case can be made for the assimilation of radiation 
and radioactive fall-out to poison. If introduced into the body in 
sufficiently large doses, they produce symptoms which are indistin-
guishable from those of poisoning and inflict death or serious damage 
to health in, as Gentili would have put it, a manner more befitting 
demons .than civilised human beings.114 
Dr. Schwarzenberger is correct, of course, in pointing out that sufficiently 
large amounts of radiation can cause death. I t is also true that sufficiently 
large gunshot wounds can produce death. It is not suggested, however, 
100 McDougal & Feliciano 660- 6 1. 
110 Spaight 275, n. 5. 
111 McDougal & Feliciano 66 1-62. 
1
u Schwarzenberger, Th e Legality of Nuclear Weapons passim ( 1958) . 
113 I d. at 33. 
l H I d. at 35 (footnote omitted). 
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that guns should be deemed unlawful weapons of war. Radiation effects 
are usually associated with nuclear explosions but they are regarded as 
ancillary to the principal blast effects.115 
In an analogy drawn from the prohibition upon the use of poison gas, 
Dr. Schwarzenberger relies upon the Geneva Gas Protocol which, it will 
be recalled, prohibits "asphixiating, poisonous, or other gases" and, in 
addition, •'all analogous liquids, materials or devices." Dr. Schwarzenber-
ger states: 
If the radiation and fall-out effects of nuclear weapons can be likened 
to poison, all the more can they be likened to poison gas which is 
but an even more closely analogous species of the genus "poison." 116 
These interesting analogies and derivations drawn from the use of the 
word-symbols "poison" and "poisonous, or other gases" in earlier and 
different contexts reflect accurately the revulsion which all humanitarians 
share regarding nuclear weapons. The central issue concerning lawfulness 
which must be resolved, however, is whether or not all possible uses of 
nuclear weapons, taking into account the wide variations in the possible 
factual contexts, must always involve disproportionate destruction of 
human values in relation to the military efficiency of the weapons. 
The utility of an analogy drawn from past experience in solving a new 
problem depends, of course, upon whether the fundamental values and 
policies in the analogy are similar to those involved in the new problem. 
The historic and contemporary prohibition upon the use of poison appears 
to be based upon its inefficiency as a weapon.117 Such an analogy does 
not seem to be particularly helpful in ascertaining the lawfulness of nuclear 
weapons since it does not consider the issue of their efficiency. In the same 
way, the prohibition upon the initial use of poison gas, and its observance 
in combat during the Second World War appear to be based upon sub-
stantial doubt as to the net military utility where both sides possess the 
weapon.118 The question as to the net military utility of nuclear weapons 
in different factual contexts raises issues which go beyond the poison gas 
analogy. In addition, nuclear weapons with distinctive characteristics of 
their own are of such importance that they necessitate direct appraisal. 
In view of these fundamental considerations, analogies, even though based 
upon humanitarian objectives, provide an inadequate problem-solving 
methodology in determining the lawfulness of nuclear weapons. Even if 
it is assumed that the analogies invoked possess some contemporary rele-
vance, they should be employed only as ancillary analytical techniques. 
There is, in summary, no adequate alternative to a direct analysis which 
115 The principal character of the blast effects is indicated in op. cit. supra note 
104 at 102-315. 
116 Op. cit. supra note 112 at 38 (footnote omitted). 
117 See the text accompanying supra notes 8-11. 
118 See the text accompanying supra notes 80-83 ; 100. 
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considers the characteristics and the uses of the wide range of weapons 
which are subsumed under the label of "nuclear." 119 
There are further persuasive reasons to doubt that nuclear weapons 
are now illegal without qualification. Two nuclear weapons, as is well 
known, were actually employed just before the end of the Second World 
War. In addition, large numbers of these weapons exist in the military 
stockpiles of the two military "superpowers" as well as in smaller numbers 
in the stockpiles of three other major powers. However distressing it may 
be, the existence of these weapons indicates the possibility, or even the 
probability, of their use in certain types of future coercive situations. 
It is ancient juridical wisdom that legal analysis involves more than 
logic.120 Even if it were assumed that the analogies of writers arguing the 
illegality of nuclear '"'·eapons were logically unexceptionable, this would 
only be a portion of the necessary analysis. Experience suggests that the 
concept of "law" is more meaningful when associated with at least the 
possibility of some enforcement or sanction than when used without refer-
ence to enforceability.121 The writers urging the illegality of nuclear 
weapons appear to give little or no consideration to the sanctions problems. 
The determination of such illegality without even a remote prospect of 
enforcement creates illusion rather than the type of more effective social 
control usually associated with the concept of "law." 122 It is a particularly 
dangerous illusion since it could lead to the belief that the difficult and 
complex processes involved in the effective control of nuclear weapons 
have already been achieved. It appears to be the wiser juridical analysis, 
as well as the safer one, to determine the issue of the lawfulness of nuclear 
weapons with full regard for the necessity to combine doctrines with 
sanctions to achieve enforceable law. 
Unlike the situation concerning biological and chemical weapons, there 
are no conventional rules which even purport to prohibit or limit nuclear 
weapons. It seems unsound and dangerous to assume illegality in the 
absence of express and direct conventional agreement.123 In addition, it 
· 
119 The analysis by Cagle in op. cit. supra note 105 is based upon the existence of 
weapons ranging from small "tactical" to large "strategic" ones. 
12:) If citation of authority is needed, the classic statement is: "The life of the law 
has not been logic: it has been experience." Holmes, The Common Law 1 ( 1881; 
reprint 1938). 
121 The centrality of sanctions in maintaining at least minimum world public order 
is demonstrated in McDougal & Feliciano 261-383. 
l2:J If "law" is not used to include at least a modicum of sanction, a distinction 
must be made between law which can be enforced and that which cannot to promote 
necessary clarity in meaning. 
123 
The same conclusion is reached in O'Brien, "Legitimate Military Necessity in 
Nuclear War," 2 World Polity 35, 116 ( 1960). 
The present validity of nuclear weapons is upheld by Prof. Stone in a brief 
analysis. Stone 343-44. 
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is probable that the nonuse of nuclear weapons since 1945 indicates con-
siderations such as the absence of a general war rather than the develop-
ment of customary agreement prohibiting these weapons. 
It is well known that the three principal nuclear powers, the United 
States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom, have been engaged 
over a considerable period of time in diplomatic negotiations which are 
designed to achieve an international agreement under which nuclear weap-
ons would be effectively "outlawed" or "abolished." 124 This tends to 
support the view that nuclear weapons are lawful, at least in some contexts, 
until the negotiations result in such an agreement. Such weapons appear 
to be valid now in the same way that the persistent claims designed to 
make the submarine an unlawful combatant unit conceded its lawful status 
by necessary implication, at least pending the achievement of a prohibitory 
agreement. 
b. THE LAWFULNESS OF PARTICULAR USES OF NU-
CLEAR WEAPONS 
The use of biological and chemical weapons as legitimate reprisals 
in response to the illegal use of these same weapons has already been 
considered.125 Even if it is assumed that nuclear weapons are unlawful, 
it seems clear that they may be lawfully used as legitimate reprisals in 
retaliation to the unlawful use of such weapons. There may also be other 
grim situations in which their use should be upheld juridically under the 
doctrines concerning legitimate reprisals. Professor Lauterpacht has pro-
vided this example: 
[I]f during the Second World War it had become established beyond 
all reasonable doubt that Germany was engaged in a systematic plan 
of putting to death of millions of civilians in occupied territory, the 
use of the atomic bomb might have been justifiable as a deterrent 
instrument of punishment.126 
It does not, of course, require extended legal argument to demonstrate 
that the Nazi killings of millions of innocent civilians were mass murders. 
It is well established that the purpose of reprisal measures is to deter 
illegal acts and it is obvious that these particular illegal acts should have 
been deterred if at all possible. Only one qualification, therefore, is sug-
gested concerning Professor Lauterpacht's statement. If the atomic bomb 
had been used as a deterrent, it could be justified properly as a reprisal 
only if it had been directed with the greatest possible precision at the Nazi 
murderers so as to minimize, and if possible eliminate completely, the 
ancillary killing of the victims of the Nazis and of other civilians. 
1
M The principal contemporary proposals and counterproposals appear in U.S. Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament 1965 ( 1966). 
125 See the text accomanying supra note 102. 
126 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 351. 
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It will be recalled that, aside from the doctrines regarding reprisals, 
the accepted test concerning the lawfulness of the use of a weapon is that 
it must not create value destruction which is out of proportion to the 
military advantage achieved by it.127 A different test to determine the 
lawfulness of nuclear weapons has not been developed in either conven-
tional or customary international law and, consequently, the traditional 
test must be applied to these new weapons. Professor McDougal and Dr. 
Feliciano have made this careful formulation of the test: 
[T]he fundamental policy of minimum unnecessary destruction may 
be seen to underlie questions of legitimacy .... [W]here the suffering 
or deprivation of values incidental to the use of a particular weapon 
is not excessively disproportionate to the military advantage accruing 
to the belligerent user, the violence and the weapon by which it is 
effected may be regarded as permissible. All war instruments are 
"cruel" and "inhuman" in the sense that they cause destruction and 
human suffering. It is not, however, the simple fact of destruction, 
nor even the amount thereof, that is relevant in the appraisal of such 
instruments; it is rather the needlessness, the superfluity of harm, the 
gross imbalance between the military result and the incidental injury 
that is commonly regarded as decisive of illegitimacy.128 
Claims relating to the lawfulness of particular uses of nuclear weapons 
may be considered conveniently in two subsidiary categories. The first con-
sists of claims concerning the fact situations which may occur in naval war-
fare in a future general war. The second comprises claims concerning the 
fact situations which may occur in "strategic" nuclear bombardment In 
such a war.129 
( 1) Claims Concerning Nuclear Weapons in Naval Warfare 
Relatively small atomic weapons of the type usually characterized 
as "tactical" have been developed for specialized use in naval warfare.130 
In addition to the homing high-speed torpedoes with nuclear warheads 
which comprise significant submarine offensive weapons, there are also 
nuclear weapons which have particular significance in antisubmarine war-
fare. Professor Kuenne has described one of these as follows: 
127 See the statements of the test which are quoted in the text accompanying supra 
notes 35-3 7. 
The Law of Naval Warfare states concerning nuclear weapons: 
There is at present no rule of international law expressly prohibiting states from 
the use of nuclear weapons in warfare. In the absence of express prohibition, 
the use of such weapons against enemy combatants and other military objectives 
is permit ted. 
Section 613 (footnote omitted ) . 
1~ McDougal & Feliciano 615-16. 
129 Subheadings making specific reference to future general war are used in Chs. 
III and IV. The future oriented character of much of the ensuing text is apparent. 
130 See the text of Ch. I accompanying notes 42- 43. 
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The atomic depth charge, Lulu, which can kill a submarine within 
two or three miles of its detonation point, can be dropped only if friendly 
surface craft are not in the vicinity.131 
A traditional depth charge with TNT explosive which is directed with 
precision at a submerged submarine will most usually sink the submarine 
and result in the killing or drowning of its entire crew. In achieving such 
destruction, the nuclear depth charge is very similar to the traditional 
one. The greatly enhanced efficiency of the nuclear charge, ho\t\·ever, is 
evident in its ability to "kill" a submarine within a radius of "two or three 
miles of its detonation point." The military result is that one nuclear depth 
charge, even when employed with imprecise aiming is probably more 
likely to destroy a submarine than a number of better aimed traditional 
charges. In a general naval war in which both attack submarines and 
fleet ballistic missile submarines are employed, it is difficult to believe that 
only traditional depth charges and torpedoes will be employed in attacking 
them. The reasons for this conclusion include the existing stockpiles of 
these "tactical" weapons and the naval expectations concerning their use.132 
There is no doubt, of course, concerning the status of such belligerent 
warships as lawful objects of attack. 
In view of the great military efficiency of "tactical" nuclear depth 
charges, torpedoes, and similar weapons in the situation described, they 
will probably be appraised as lawful providing that the ancillary destruc-
tion of values is not disproportionate to their military efficiency. There is 
no doubt that there would be some ocean water contamination involved 
in the use of these and other nuclear weapons at sea. In addition, the 
sinking of a nuclear-powered submarine would probably cause further 
water contamination.133 In view of the primacy which has been histori-
cally accorded to military efficiency in general war, there is reason to 
believe that the traditional criteria would be applied to uphold the lawful-
ness of "tactical" nuclear weapons at sea in future general wars. This 
tentative prediction, it must be emphasized, assumes the minimization of 
ancillary injuries to both of the belligerent sides and to the neutrals. 
The use of the "strategic" or very large thermonuclear weapons at sea, 
however, would probably be unlawful in the tactical naval warfare situa-
131 Kuenne, The Polaris Missile Strike: A General Economic Systems Analysis 57 
( 1966). 
See the emphasis on the importance of antisubmarine warfare in Demyanov (Eng.-
Capt. 2nd Rank, U.S.S.R. Navy), "A Soviet View of Antisubmarine Warfare" [trans!. 
from Russian], 9 Navy: The Magazine of Sea Power No. 10, p. 21 (1966). 
132 See Cagle, op. cit. supra note 105 passim. 
133 The spread of radiation following "a shallow underwater burst" is described in 
op. cit. supra note 104 at 469, section 9-128. In the situation described in the text · 
it is assumed that there would also be some contamination of fish and other Ilving 
organisms of the sea. 
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tions just described. Such large weapons would produce much greater 
environmental contamination. Where a tactical nuclear weapon would 
achieve the same military purpose, such excessive contamination as well 
as other excessive ancillary damage is unnecessary and therefore unlawful. 
In the same way, such large weapons could result in an unlawful "overkilJ" 
by the destruction of values beyond those necessary to obtain the military 
objective. 
There are different naval warfare contexts in which it is even possible 
that the use of "strategic" thermonuclear weapons may meet the test of 
lawfulness. Prior to the Second World War, naval battles were conducted 
typically with each of the battle fleets within visual sight of the other. 
The Battle of the Coral Sea in the early part of the Second World War 
was the first major naval engagement in which the principal combatant 
ships did not come within visual contact.1_34 The decisive aspect of the 
battle was the attacks made by airplanes from the fleet aircraft carriers. 
It is not impossible in a future general war at sea that a squadron of sub-
merged fleet ballistic missile submarines may employ thermonuclear weap-
ons in attacking a similar squadron of the enemy belligerent. Polaris mis-
siles, as is \veil known, may be launched while the submarine is submerged. 
There are apparently no technical reasons why these or similar weapons 
could not reenter the water environment after their flight and seek out 
their submarine targets.135 The present issue concerns the lawfulness of the 
employment of thermonuclear weapons in the assumed situation. If it 
could be demonstrated that these weapons possess the efficiency which is 
necessary to achieve the military objective and, further, that tactical nu-
clear weapons lack such efficiency, it would be persuasive as to the lawful-
ness of this use of thermonuclear weapons. If it could also be demonstrated 
that the ancillary destruction of values injuring the belligerents and the 
neutrals was minimal, it would further strengthen an argument of lawful-
ness. In making such a determination concerning the issue of legality, it 
would be necessary to give full consideration, inter alia, to both the short-
range and long-range effects of envirnomental contamination.136 
(2) Claims Concerning Strategic Nuclear Bombardment 
One of the principal military capabilities of the fleet ballistic 
missile submarine is the bombardment of targets located on land with 
,nuclear or traditional explosives. Because of this, the ensuing legal analysis 
is functionally similar to that usually described as "aerial bombardment" 
or "strategic bombardment." In a juridical appraisal the particular type of 
launching vehicle, vessel, or device for a nuclear weapon, whether a sub-
lM Potter & Nimitz 667. 
130 The contemporary Polaris missiles are described in Kuenne 178. 
136 See op. cit. supra note 104 at 316- 501. 
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marine warship, a surface one, an aircraft, a land-based installation, or a 
launching system in space 137 would not appear to be of major significance. 
(a) CLAIMS CoNCERNING TARGET SELECTION 
The hypothetical situations considered concerning nuclear war 
at sea were relatively simple in one respect because they involved only 
military targets. Target selection in land areas where civilian populations 
reside presents more difficult issues. 
The only treaty law concerning target selection in aerial bombardment 
appears in the Regulations Annexed to Hague Convention No. IV ( 1907): 
The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, 
dwellings, or buildings which are undefended is prohibited.138 
The words, "by whatever means," were probably designed to refer to 
dirigibles and heavier-than-air aircraft at the time they were written. It 
would be a rather extreme over-extrapolation to interpret them as some-
how referring to ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads and other con-
temporary weapons which were not even thought of in 1907.139 This con-
ventional doctrine was an attempt to apply by analogy the land warfare 
test of "undefended" towns used at the turn of the century to the different 
problems involved in aerial bombardment. Land warfare rules concerning 
bombardment at that time were formulated on the basis of the technology 
of land artillery which was then probably more efficient than the aerial 
bombardment methods. It is well known that this provision of the Hague 
Regulations was not observed in aerial bombardment in either of the World 
Wars.140 
The somewhat more relevant analogy which has been employed in 
actual practice in aerial target selection is drawn from the naval bombard-
ment test of "military objectives." This test as applied to traditional naval 
bombardment was limited technologically by the range of naval gunfire. 
In applying the test of "military objectives" to nuclear bombardment by 
modern military aircraft, Polaris missiles, and space-launching devices, it 
is apparent that there is no place upon the earth which cannot be reached. 
A place, however, cannot lawfully be subjected to bombardment unless a 
military objective is located in it. 
Although they are not conventional law, the draft Hague Rules of 
Aerial Warfare ( 1923) 141 adopt this military objective test which has been 
applied in both World Wars: 
Aerial bombardment is legitimate only when directed at a military 
137 See supra note 30. 
138 Art. 25. 
139 Prof. Scott stated that the words "by whatever means" meant that "bombard-
ment by balloons, if and when possible, is to be controlled and regulated as other 
bombardments." 1 Scott 652. 
140 As to World War I see 1 Garner 4Jj8-67. 
H
1 Text in 17 A.].I.L. Supp. 245 ( 1923). 
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objective, that is to say, an object of which the destruction or injury 
would constitute a distinct military advantage to the belligerent.142 
An obvious example of a target which is a lawful military objective is a 
naval shipyard. An equally obvious example of unlawful target selection 
was involved in the German use of the V-1 (flying bomb) and V-2 (long-
range rocket) weapons near the end of the Second World War. These 
weapons were simply directed at a general area comprising metropolitan 
London without regard to any military objective.143 
The actual historical facts indicate, however unpleasant the contempla-
tion of this may be, that considerable ancillary civilian destruction has 
been tolerated in the application of the test providing that the target is a 
lawful military objective. This is, nevertheless, better than a doctrine which 
would allow civilians to be made direct objects of attack. Professor Lauter-
pacht's characterization of the fundamental principle of customary inter-
national law prohibiting the use of terror airected against civilians as "an 
absolute rule of law" has been referred to previously.144 Unless this basic 
humanitarian doctrine is effectively sanctioned, it is futile to attempt to 
maintain that there is a meaningful international law of war. If this single 
principle is violated systematically, the subsidiary doctrines which are de-
signed to protect humanitarian values are rendered meaningless.145 In an 
era of weapons of mass destruction with rapid missile delivery techniques 
there is a measure of sanction to enforce this principle at least in the 
decisions of rational government officials. If one side can employ terror 
against the civilian population in a general war situation, it is apparent 
that the other can do the same thing. This is a negative sanction to im-
plement a humanitarian doctrine but it is of use nonetheless if it operates 
with some effectiveness. The positive sanctions include a mental perspec-
tive of common humanity which encompasses the enemy civilians as well 
as those of the same nationality as the decision-maker. The conjoining of 
these sanctions, with any other available ones added, constitute only ad hoc 
devices to provide some measure of protection for humanity pending the 
construction · of a better world public order system which, at the least, 
effectively prevents general war.146 
(b) CLAIMS CoNCERNING THE LIMITATION OF DESTRUCTION 
The present analysis concerns the issues involving the limita-
tion of ancillary destruction where it is assumed that a lawful target is 
u2 Art. 24, paragraph 1. 
143 Description appears in Spaight 214-17. 
144 See the text of Ch. IV accompanying note 2. 
145 The prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons for the terrorization "of the gen-
eral enemy population" is stressed in McDougal & Feliciano 668. 
146 Some of the steps designed to provide an improved public order are considered 
in McDougal, "Perspectives for an International Law of Human Dignity," 53 Proc. 
A.S.I.L. 107 ( 1959). 
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attacked. Rules of ideal doctrinal content would, of course, prohibit any 
ancillary destruction of or injury to civilians in attacks on lawful military 
objectives. The difficulty with such a doctrinal formulation is that experi-
ence indicates it has little or no prospect of being enforced in a future 
general war. It is clear that in the relevant past belligerent practices, states 
have tolerated substantial ancillary destruction of civilian values. The fact 
is, even taking into account the development of efficient bombsights, radar 
instruments, night and bad weather guidance techniques, and similar 
devices, that as many as a third of the bombs dropped by aircraft usually 
fall outside of "a large factory" target.147 The central factual point is that 
the bombardment of military objectives, as a matter of uniform past experi-
ence and probable future expectation involves some incidental destruction 
of civilian life. 
The draft Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare ( 1923) attempted to prohibit 
what is now termed "strategic bombardment." The relevant provision 
states: 
The bombardment of cities, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings 
not in the immediate neighborhood of the operations of land forces is 
prohibited.148 
This reflects an attempt to limit aerial bombardment to tactical situations 
where the use of the bombardment is closely related to "the operations of 
land forces." 
It is well known that during the Second World War massive "strategic 
bombardment" employing large numbers of aircraft carrying traditional 
explosives was used.149 This method of bombardment was practiced by the 
major belligerents even though the selected military targets such as fac-
tories or military installations were in heavily populated areas where it was 
clear that many civilians would be and were killed. In the same way, the 
two uses thus far of nuclear weapons during war, the attacks on Hiroshima 
and on Nagasaki, involved great destruction of civilian lives although 
military objectives were at the center of the targets.150 
The International Committee of the Red Cross Draft Rules ( 1956) pro-
vide constructive suggestions designed to minimize the ancil1ary destruction 
of civilians. One modest provision, for example, states: 
1
'
7 Possony, Strategic Air Power: The Pattern of Dynamic Security 55 ( 1949). 
148 Art. 24, paragraph 3. 
149 See, e.g., Harris, Bomber Offensive (1947). 
150 The military opjectives are stated by Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War dur-
ing World War II, in "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," 194 Harper's Maga-
zine97 (Feb. 1947). 
Criticism of the action in using the nuclear weapons appears in Sack, "ABC-
Atomic, Biological, Chemical Warfare in International Law," 10 Lawyers Guild Rev. 
161 ( 1950). 
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The person responsible for ordering or launching an attack shall, 
first of all: 
(a) make sure that the objective, or objectives, to be attacked are 
military objectives within the meaning of the present rule and 
are duly identified. 
When the military advantage to be gained leaves the choice 
open between several objectives, he is required to select the one, 
an attack on which involves least danger for the civilian popu-
lation ... 151 
Since it does not interfere with military efficiency, this provision should be 
implemented to minimize harm to civilians. 
United States v. Ohlendorf 152 presents a judicial perspective concerning 
the ancillary destruction of civilians in aerial bombardment. The facts of 
the case concerned the infamous Einsatzgruppen which were the special 
task forces employed by the Nazis to murder the "inferior" civilian persons 
behind the military lines in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union. The 
defendants claimed, inter alia, that there was no meaningful distinction 
between the systematic killing of civilians who were members of one or 
more of the proscribed groups as the defendants had done and killing 
civilians with atomic bombs as the United States had done in Japan.153 
In response to this argument the judgment stated: 
A city is bombed for tactical purposes; communications are to be 
destroyed, railroads wrecked, ammunition plants demolished, factories 
razed, all for the purpose of impeding the military. In these operations 
it inevitably happens that nonmilitary persons are killed. This is an 
incident, a grave incident to be sure, but an unavoidable corollary of 
battle action. The civilians are not individualized. The bomb falls, it 
is aimed at the railroad yards, houses along the tracks are hit and 
many of their occupants killed. But that is entirely different, both in 
fact and in law, from an armed force marching up to these same rail-
road track~, entering those houses abutting thereon, dragging out the 
men, women, and children and shooting them.154 
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
characterized the "wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devas-
tation not justified by military necessity" as a war crime.155 None of the 
major war criminals, however, was charged with indiscriminate aerial 
151 Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Popula-
tion in Time of War, art. 8 (a) ( 1956). 
:usa "The Einsatzgruppen Case," 4 Trials of War Crims. 1. 
153 Id. at 466, 467. The testimony of Ohlendorf on this general subject appears in 
id. at 355-5 7. 
15•4 Trials of War Crims. 1, 467. 
llSG Art. 6(b). Text in 1 I.M.T. 10, 11. 
180 
bombing. In addition, the United Nations War Crimes Commission in 
preparing lists of persons who, prima facie~ appeared to have committed 
a war crime, rejected cases alleging illegal aerial bombardment if the 
places bombarded contained military objectives.156 
Dr. Spaight has attempted to make a fundamental legal discrimination 
between strategic bombardment which involves target-area bombing by 
large numbers of aircraft using traditional weapons and strategic bombard-
ment using atomic weapons. He states: 
[International law] should hold to the view that, while target-area 
bombing comes close to the borderline of permissibility, atom bomb-
ing definitely oversteps it. To change the metaphor, one might say 
that target-area bombing remains anchored-under strain-to the 
rule of the military objective, which must now be regarded as inter-
national law; atom bombing breaks adrift.157 
This argument appears to be based on the assumption that where nuclear 
weapons are employed there is no possibility whatsoever of limiting the 
ancillary destruction connected with the attack upon the military target. 
The opposite assumption is made concerning target-area bombing. Both 
assumptions seem to be open to considerable doubt because of the con-
temporary range in the size and explosive power of various nuclear weap-
ons and the past conduct of target-area bombing. It does not seem possible 
to state with certainty that under no circumstances could a nuclear weapon, 
or several of them, be used in a manner which effectively limits ancillary 
destruction. Although as used by the Allied Powers during the Second 
World War, target-area bombing with traditional weapons placed very 
few effective limitations upon ancillary destruction, such bombing could 
also be used so as to limit such destruction more effectively. 
The significant differences for present purposes between traditional 
explosives employed in very large quantities and one or more nuclear 
weapons concern the initial and residual effects which are associated with 
the nuclear weapons.158 The "dirty" nuclear weapon is one which places a 
large amount of radiation in the environment.159 Such radiation, and its 
consequent deadly or injurious effects, will be manifested in the immediate 
area of the explosion in particular and throughout the world environment 
in general over a considerable period of time.160 On the other hand, _a 
"clean" nuclear bomb is designed, like traditional bombs, to be deadly in 
its blast and heat effects but to minimize the associated radiation effects.161 
156 Digest of Laws and Cases, 15 Reps. U.N. Comm. 110, n. 2. 
157 Spaight 276. 
158 U.S. Dept. of Defense, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons 369-413 (initial 
effects), 414-501 (residual effects) (rev. ed. 1962). 
159 I d . at 435-36. 
160 See id. at 4 73-88. 
161 The technological limitations upon reducing the radiation effects of nuclear 
weapons are described in id. at 435-36. 
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The radiation effects of the "dirty" bomb can impose continuing destruc-
tion upon the civilian population after the bombing has stopped. It seems 
clear, consequently, that this type of effect from the use of nuclear weap-
ons may impose unreasonably high and disproportionate levels of destruc-
tion upon the civilian population. These factual differences justify a differ-
ent juridical appraisal of such nuclear weapons. It should be maintained 
that where the radiation effects are likely to cause such high and dispro-
portionate levels of destruction of the civilian population, the nuclear 
weapon should be regarded as unlawful in a situation where a number of 
traditional weapons with the same blast and heat effects would be deemed 
lawful. Among the sanctions to uphold this differential juridical treatment 
is the common self-interest of all mankind, including rational decision-
makers, in preserving the earth and its environment as habitable for 
humanity. 
The comments concerning the military inefficiency of biological or 
chemical weapons which are uncontrollable by their belligerent users are 
equally applicable to nuclear weapons which are similarly uncontrollable. 
The International Committee of the Red Cross Draft Rules ( 1956) make 
this recommendation concerning uncontrollable weapons: 
Without prejudice to the present or future prohibition of certain 
specific weapons, the use is prohibited of weapons whose harmful 
effects-resulting in particular from the dissemination of incendiary, 
chemical, bacteriological, radioactive or other agents-could spread to 
an unforeseen degree or escape, either in space or in time, from the 
control of those who employ them, thus endangering the civilian pop-
ulation.162 
In such an extreme situation, considerations of humanity and those of 
military efficiency should be combined to protect common humanity from 
mass destruction. The most obvious way to avoid destruction of civilian 
values by nuclear weapons is not to use such weapons. The constructive 
contemporary use of nuclear weapons is in their role as inducements to 
avoid general war. They are now being used as the key element in a mutual 
deterrence system which establishes a primitive minimum public order 
based on the threat of mutual nuclear disaster.163 
C. CLAIMS CON·CERNING WEAPONS OF ATTACK IN 
LIMITED WAR 
In the appraisal of other aspects of limited war, a central distinction 
has been made between limited wars involving major powers as the par-
162 Art. 14, paragraph 1. 
163 The nuclear deterrence role of fleet ballistic rriissile submarines is considered in 
Kuenne, The Polaris Missile Strike: A General Economic Systems Analysis 65 and 
passim ( 1966). 
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tictpants and similar wars where minor powers comprise the participants. 
Such an organization appears less useful in considering the lawfulness of 
particular weapons in limited war situations. Most states have armaments 
which include, even though in very modest degree in some instances, 
traditional naval weapons.164 In addition, there is an existing trend toward 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons which will apparently continue unless 
conventional agreements are reached to prevent it effectively.165 The 
present organization, consequently, will consider the same weapons cate-
gories used in the general war analysis. At the outset, it should be stated 
that the limitation of weapons is indispensable if limited wars are not to 
be replaced by or "escalated" into general wars.166 
Weapons of mass destruction which are uncontrollable in the hands of 
their belligerent users have been referred to in the context of general war. 
Even in general war situations, such weapons cannot be justified as lawful 
by the most expanded conceptions of military necessity since they do not 
achieve military objectives without disproportionate ancillary destruction.167 
It is obvious that they also lack military efficiency and lawfulness in limited 
war. A narrow conception of the tactical controllability of weapons is also 
necessary in limited war situations and the weapons used must be con-
sistent with the limited political objectives which are postulated.168 
The customary law test involving a determination of the reasonable 
proportionality between the military efficiency of the weapon and the 
ancillary <~estruction of values caused by its use is also employed in deter-
mining the lawfulness of weapons in limited war.169 The point which must 
be stressed, however, is that the same juridical principle used in weapons 
appraisal in general war is now being applied in the very different con-
text of limited war. If it is assumed that exactly the same weapon were 
used in each type of war, a certain degree of ancillary destruction of values 
which would be acceptable in general war might well be quite unaccept-
able and, consequently, unlawful in limited war. 
A recognized naval authority has written concerning the combat capabili-
1~ Le Masson ( ed.), Les Flottes de Combat 1966 lists eighty states which have 
navies (or functionally equivalent organizations) with associated vessels and weapons. 
165 The facts are well known. See The American Assembly, A World of Nuclear 
Powers? (Buchan ed. 1966). . 
166 The textual statement is obvious. The point is stressed in Osgood 248-50 and 
passim. 
167 Prof. O'Brien advances a careful and balanced conception of military necessity 
in "Legitimate Military Necessity in Nuclear War," 2 World Polity 35 ( 1960). He 
stresses the relevance of the central concept of proportionality in appraising the 
facts. I d. at 69-82. Of course, some facts, such as the genetic effects of radiation, 
are not understood adequately. See id. at 72-73. 
168 See the analysis of tactical nuclear weapons in limited war in Osgood 251-59. 
169 See the test as formulated by Prof. McDougal and Dr. Feliciano in the text 
accompanying supra note 128. 
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ties of the U.S. Navy in the war in Vietnam: 
The United States Navy is ... a gentle giant. It must be a source 
of wonder to many a nation, especially to any aggressively inclined, 
why the United States, with such a colossal naval strength at its com-
mand, capable of landing any size of military force and mounting any 
size of air strike, has not bulldozed her way to the objective in Viet-
nam. The U.S. Navy is doubtless capable not only of containing any 
possible combination of Vietnamese forces arrayed against it but of 
countering any force that any co-belligerents might have available 
in that sphere. Yet, the U.S.N. attack craft, surface, submarine or air, 
the amphibious ships, support vessels, transports and auxiliaries have 
shown the restraint necessary 'to channel down the operations to 
limited and conventional war.170 
In his 1967 State of the Union Message the President of the United 
States stressed other factors than weapons- capability and military power. 
His statement raised a fundamental question concerning the conduct of 
limited war by the United States: 
Whether we can fight a war of limited objectives over a period of 
time, and keep alive the hope of independence and stability for people 
other than ourselves; whether we can continue to act with restraint 
when the temptation to "get it over with" is inviting but dangerous; 
whether we can accept the necessity of choosing "a great evil in order 
to ward off a greater"; whether we can do these without arousing 
the hatreds and the passions that are ordinarily loosed in time of war-
on all these questions so much turns.171 
1. Traditional Naval Weapons 
The weapons now under consideration are the same traditional ones 
which have been considered in connection with general war. Such weap-
ons of considerable destructive power have been employed in limited wars. 
During the Korean War, for example, the North Korean forces employed 
~odern sea mines, including acoustic and magnetic types, with consider-
able effectiveness.172 The Soviet Union provided technical assistance in 
these operations.173 It is necessary to recognize that because a weapon may 
be accurately characterized as "traditional" does not, without more con-
sideration, provide reasonable assurance of the lawfulness of its use in all 
170 Blackman ( ed.), fane's Fighting Ships 1965-66 iv~ v. 
171 "The State of the Union" (delivered Jan. 10, 1967), 56 Dept . of State Bull. 
158, 163 (Jan. 30, 1967). 
President John Adams' central role in limiting the limited naval war with France 
is described in Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the Amercan People 94- 97 (6th ed. 
1958). 
172 Cagle & Manson 142--46. 
173 Ibid. 
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the divergent fact situations of limited war. If the traditional torpedo with 
a warhead of TNT explosives were used against merchant ships not par-
ticipating in the war or hostilities, for example, it would be a violation of 
the Submarine Protocol. In addition, such use might make the continuing 
limitation of the war most difficult if not impossible. 
It should be obvious that the availability of traditional weapons of all 
kinds, including specialized naval ones, is indispensable for limited war 
purposes.174 In the same way, there must be a carefully thought out and 
continuingly updated naval doctrine concerning weapons uses in limited 
war.175 If these important matters are not adequately recognized the 
results could be disastrous. A major power which neglects traditional 
weapons and tactical nuclear ones in favor of overemphasis upon large 
nuclear and thermonuclear ones could be confronted with a situation 
where it has no better alternative than a choice between general war 
involving the use of weapons of mass_ destruction on the one hand or sur-
render on the other. 
2. Traditional Naval Bombardment 
The historic examples of traditional naval bombardment of land targets 
which were mentioned in connection with general war situations involved 
only modest legal limitation upon the efficiency of the bombardment be-
cause of the "military objective" test employed in the applicable conven-
tional law.176 Military interest, nevertheless, imposed meaningful limita-
tions upon needless destruction of values. The basic military principle of 
economy of force required the careful control of naval gunfire so as to 
maximize military injury to the enemy. It is well known that naval gun-
fire, along with aircraft bombing attacks, was used as the spearhead of the 
great United States amphibious operations in the Pacific War.177 In this 
use of naval gunfire it was not a matter of promoting the principle of 
humanity alone to direct the gunfire at specific military objectives, such 
as gun installations and aircraft runways, but it was also a matter of simple 
174 Seim, "Are We Ready to Wage Limited War?" 87 Nav. Inst. Proc. No. 3, p. 27 
( 1961). 
The interest of the Soviet Union in traditional weapons is indicated in Marsh~l 
of the Soviet Union Sokolovskii ( ed.), Soviet Military Strategy 51 and passim (Rand 
Corp. transl. 1963) . 
175 Cagle, "A Philosophy for Naval Atomic War," 83 Nav. Inst. Proc. 249 ( 1957) 
is a thoughtful and fundamental contribution. See also the careful consideration of 
the limited war role of the aircraft carrier in Gormley, "Limited War and the Strik-
ing Fleets," 89 Nav. Inst. Proc. No. 2, p. 53 ( 1963). 
The related necessity of legal doctrines for limited war is thoughtfully considered 
in Baldwin, "A New Look at the Law of War: Limited War and Field Manual 
27-10," 4 Military L. Rev. 1 (Army Pam. No. 27- 100-4; 1959). 
176 See the text accompanying supra notes 61-63. 
177 See Potter & Nimitz 745-48 and p~ssim. 
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self-preservation. Unless the Japanese military targets on land were effec-
tively destroyed, they had the capacity to sink or severely damage the 
battleships 178 and other warships comprising the attack force. 
The conjoining of the principles of humanity and military necessity to 
protect human values should be even more important in a limited war 
naval bombardment situation. The United States amphibious landing at 
Inchon in the early part of the Korean War was preceded by a heavy 
naval bombardment.179 The specific character of this bombardment has 
been authoritatively described as follows: 
Vice Admiral Struble's orders to the bombardment forces clearly 
specified that there should be no promiscuous firing at the city itself 
or at civilian installations. To achieve this, the entire objective area 
had been divided into 60 sub-areas. Known military targets had been 
previously assigned, and those which offered the greatest potential 
hazard to our landing troops were circled in red. It had been agreed 
that any ship could fire into a red-circle area with or without a 
"spot." In the uncircled areas, however, firing was permitted only if 
definite targets were found and an air spot was available. This differ-
entiation between types of areas was adopted to reduce destruction 
of nonmilitary targets to a minimum, to save the city of Inchon for 
occupation forces, and to avoid injury to civilian personnel. ... 
[Struble ordered:] Bombing and gunfire will be confined to targets 
whose destruction will contribute to the conduct of operations-ac-
curate gunfire and pinpoint bombing against specific targets, rather 
than area destruction, is contemplated.180 
3. Biological and Chemical Weapons 
The juridical appraisal concerning the use of biological and chemical 
weapons which are uncontrollable by the belligerent user in general war 181 
is even more applicable, a fortiori, in limited war situations. If biological 
or chemical weapons are to be used lawfully in limited war they must be 
weapons of very limited destructive power which are employed under the 
178 The Navy now maintains the four Iowa class battleships (including the 
Missouri of Japanese surrender ceremony fame) mounting nine 16-inch guns each 
in the Reserve Fleets. The New York Times: April 9, 1967, p. 1, cols. 1, 2 reports 
that consideration is being given to recommissioning one or more of these ships for 
shore bombardment purposes in the war in Vietnam because of the efficiency of their 
gunfire. [Editor's note: The decision to reactivate the battleship New Jersey for 
employment in the Pacific Fleet in augmentation of the naval gunfire support force 
in Southeast Asia was announced on August 1, 1967. Department of Defense News 
Release No. 708-67 of August 1, 1967.] 
179 Cagle & Manson 97. It involved the use of short-range rockets as well as gun-
fire. 
180 Cagle & Manson 97. 
181 See the text accompanying supra note 69. 
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most rigid technological and tactical controls. It is unfortunate that the 
broad language in the Geneva Gas Protocol referring to "poison gases" 
and then to "all analogous liquids, materials or devices" 182 is susceptible 
through mechanical interpretation to the inclusion of nonlethal biological 
or chemical weapons which produce temporary disablement of enemy 
personnel without permanent damage to the human organism. Such 
mechanical interpretation 183 is, of course, quite inconsistent with the 
humanitarian purpose of the Gas Protocol to prevent the use of highly 
injurious and destructive gases. 
There are many situations in which the use of tear gas, or similar chemi-
cal agents, imposes much less damage or injury upon enemy personnel 
than alternative weapons. The use of tear gas in preference to flame-
throwers against guerrilla troops located in entrenched positions has been 
referred to in connection with a general war situation.184 The humani-
tarian considerations in favor of the use of tear gas would appear to be at 
least equally applicable in a limited war situation. Another example in-
volves the use of weapons to control riotous prisoners of war. This was a 
practical situation which arose with North Korean prisoners of war in 
United States prisoner of war camps.185 Riots among the prisoners were 
apparently initiated for the purpose of involving effective military forces 
which might otherwise have been used at the front. Rifles and machine 
guns were used at the outset to reestablish discipline in the camps. The 
use of tear gas was finally authorized for humanitarian reasons as well as 
for efficiency.186 General Mark Clark, then the Commander of the United 
Nations Forces in Korea, apparently experienced some difficulty in obtain-
ing authorization for the use of this gas which is harmless in residual 
effects.187 The reluctance of the Department of the Army to authorize the 
use of tear gas in this situation apparently reflects the general revulsion 
shared by military personnel with civilians against any weapon which can 
be included under the label "gas." It is most unfortunate in terms of the 
impact upon human values that word symbols 188 present difficulties in 
using less harmful and less destructive weapons. If limited weapons are to 
be used in limited wars, the responsible decision makers must look beyond 
the labels to the actual effects of particular weapons. 
183 See the Gas Protocol in the text accompanying supra notes 82-83. 
183 The intellectual inadequacy of mechanical or "literal" interpretation has been 
referred to in the text of Ch. IV accompanying notes 110-11. 
184 See the text accompanying supra note 92. 
185 Rothschild, Tomorrow's Weapon: Chemical and Biological 62-63 ( 1964). 
186 I d. at 63. 
187 Ibid. 
188 Word symbols, of course, are not identical with thoughts. "A word is not a crys-
tal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary 
greatly in color and content according ~o the circumstances and the time in which 
it is used." Holmes, J. in Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418,425 (1918). 
187 
Psychological conditioning and mental predispositions are, of course, 
important factors in obtaining popular acceptance or rejection of weap-
ons. Popular views and prevailing opinions upon this subject are- also 
factors which have some bearing upon the determination of lawfulness. 
Mr.- Tompkins has written concerning weapons acceptability: 
The more direct the violence is in a weapon, the more acceptable it 
seems. People seem to object to non-violent or even non-lethal, weap-
ons more strongly than they do to the the most violent ones. While there 
is an element of conditioning in this-we accept what we are used to 
-weapons seem to be accepted the closer they approximate the 
primitive violence of cutting, crushing, and stabbing. Ordinary shells, 
bullets, and bombs are really only modern ways of reaching the same 
bloody result that the caveman got with his stone ax or obsidian-
tipped spear.189 
If this analysis is correct, it presents a bleak prospect in terms of develop-
ing and using the necessary limited weapons for limited war unless there 
is a reorientation of both military and civilian thinking in terms of facts. 
4. Nuclear Weapons 
It does not require detailed analysis to demonstrate that the use of 
large nuclear weapons and of any thermonuclear weapons presents the 
gravest problems concerning the restriction of military means employed 
in limited war. Professor Osgood has questioned whether or not the use 
of tactical nuclear weapons is consistent with the limitation of war.190 
He emphasizes that if such tactical weapons are used, national strategy 
must control their use rather than the weapons use determining national 
strategy.191 
General Taylor has also questioned the dangers involved in using even 
"small" nuclear weapons: 
[I]t also seems likely that there will be a desire to limit, if not to pre-
vent, the use of atomic weapons in local conflicts for fear of their 
unpredictable consequences in broadening the war. These tendencies 
to restrict atomic weapons may also find support from the proprietor 
of the battle zone, presumably a friend to whom we are bringing 
military aid to resist aggression. There is such destructiveness in 
atomic weapons, even in the small ones, that serious objection to their 
use in friendly territory may be anticipated from the inhabitants.192 
It has been determined previously that nuclear weapons cannot be 
convincingly appraised as unlawful per se. · It has been suggested that, 
189 Tompkins, The Weapons of World War III : The Long Road Back from the 
Bomb ( 1966). 
100 Osgood 230. 
191 I d . at 230- 31. 
192 Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet 186- 87 ( 1959) . 
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in general war situations, there may be occasions when the tactical uses 
of nuclear weapons will probably be appraised as lawful.193 It is less possi-
ble, but certainly not impossible, that the same appraisal of the lawfulness 
of particular tactical uses of nuclear weapons should be made in limited 
war situations as well. Such appraisals of probable lawfulness could only 
be made with assurance in situations where the traditional criteria of 
reasonable proportionality between the military efficiency of the weapon 
and the ancillary destruction of values could be demonstrated convincingly. 
A naval authority has formulated some of the central considerations 
involved in limited atomic warfare: 
Atomic warfare can be kept limited only if the world-friend and 
foe alike-knows the types and small sizes of weapons which could 
be used and understands the vast difference between precision atomic 
warfare and mass destruction warfare. Unless the difference between 
precision atomic warfare and massive retaliation is made clear, and 
our intention to use precision weapons delivered by precision means 
made known, the United States is irretrievably headed toward nuclear 
impotence, or drifting into what has been termed "atomic isolationism" 
and being powerless to respond to "nibbling aggression." 194 
In further development of this approach, the same writer has referred 
to three specific military objectives in the Korean War in which naval 
aircraft used traditional weapons in persistent attacks without achieving 
militarily efficient results. These targets were the Yalu River bridges, the 
key elements of the rail and road systems which were used to supply the 
North Korean armies, and the principal hydroelectric complexes in North 
Korea.195 In his view, the precision delivery of tactical nuclear weapons 
against these targets would have accomplished the military objectives with-
out disproportionate ancillary damage.196 Because of this, the examples 
employed appear to meet the accepted juridical criteria for the lawful use 
of weapons. 
In appraisal of nuclear weapons in general war it was concluded that 
the avoidance of civilian destruction is achieved most effectively by the 
nonuse of these weapons.197 This conclusion is obviously applicable in 
limited war situations also. Since there has been considerable expenence 
193 See the text accompanying supra notes 132-33. 
194 Cagle, op. cit. supra note 175 at 254. 
195 I d. at 25 7-58. 
196 Ibid. 
The explosive yields of tactical naval weapons should be very small. Weapon 
design must reduce the fall-out peril to a minimum. The delivery method must 
always endeavor to place the weapon at the precise point of aim, and the ac-
ceptable margin of error should be limited to tens of feet. 
Id. at 257. 
197 See the text accompanying supra note 163. 
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with limited wars since the end of the Second World War, the future 
projection which is grounded in past experience is that such wars are 
much more probable than a general war.198 In considering a future ap-
praisal concerning the lawfulness of nuclear weapons use in limited war 
it must be emphasized that the smaller the blast and ensuing radiation 
effects, and the more clear the minimization, or avoidance, of ancillary 
civilian destruction, the more likely an accurate appraisal of lawfulness 
becomes. In the meantime, efforts to achieve a convention which effec-
tively bans nuclear weapons should be intensified so that the appraisals 
of lawfulness referred to may be only temporary. 
198 See the statement of such probability _quoted in the text of Ch. I accompanying 
note 115. 

